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of the thirteenth century yielded perhaps £5,000, the carucage just about the same amount, the tallage on demesne not much more, whereas the thirteenth on movables levied in 1207 yielded no less than £60,000! No wonder that taxes on movables became more popular with the king as time went on and that by the beginning of the fourteenth century they had become his normal method of raising money.

In his concluding chapter Professor Mitchell takes occasion to discuss the relation of the great council of the kingdom to the king's rights of taxation. He notes the development of a feeling of corporate unity among its members which did something to offset the older view that the king's right to tax a particular tenant was a matter to which the king and the tenant alone were parties. This corporate unity of course found its most striking expression in the agitation for Magna Carta, yet except at such crises it seems to have been stronger among the separate classes in the council, such as the clergy, than in the body as a whole. To the end of the reign of Henry III the principle had clearly not been established that the individual barons were bound by the voice of the majority of their fellows to contribute to a particular tax. No more was it clear that if one group of barons in council assembled refused a tax the king could not appeal to another group to grant it. All this makes it evident that during the first half of the thirteenth century at any rate the position of the Great Council as a representative assembly even of the tenants-in-chief was not yet defined.

CONYERS READ

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. By THORSTEIN VEBLEN. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 8vo, pp. viii+324. \$1.50.

The work is an application of Professor Veblen's well-known technological interpretation of history to the case of modern Germany. It is based on the fact that to each technological system there is attached a certain apparatus of convention and standard usage, and that, in evolution of society, the latter tends to persist, surviving the former, and living on into a new industrial system, opposing and shaping its development. In such a tendency, the author finds an explanation of the conflicting ideas of Great Britain and Germany and their different governmental organizations.

Now the Germans and English are both of hybrid composition, the racial constituents being largely the same. This hybrid composition

gives a great facility in borrowing and "acts to hinder any given scheme or system from attaining a definitive stability." Thus England in early Tudor times borrowed a handicraft technology which was luckily stripped of the restrictive gild and charter regulations, the settled usages, routes, and methods that were then prevailing on the Continent. Aided, in addition, by her insularity and comparative immunity from war, England speedily developed the borrowed arts and crafts and led the way in the invention of labor-saving devices. The Continental technology fostered, on English soil, a spirit of individualism and democracy which encouraged the formulation of a philosophy of natural rights and an economic doctrine of freedom of competition. But unfortunately there grew up along with this a host of evil working conditions, an increasing obsolescence of technology, wasteful habits of living, costly amusements, armies of menials, and other unnecessary paraphernalia that impeded the increase of industrial efficiency.

Germany, however, borrowed the modern mechanical processes without the individualistic philosophy and the other economic and cultural consequences. She received the technology of Britain into a feudal system where high industrial efficiency is wedded to a spirit of fealty and subservience. But as modern industry abhors national frontiers and local traits, the hegemony of Prussia among the German kingdoms was a condition essential to German industrial prosperity. So Prussia came with a militarism more vigorous and feudalistic than the other kingdoms and formed a dynastic state in the center of Europe. She immediately turned the wonderful technological efficiency of her citizens to her own ends, and, to overcome the prejudice of her people against personal servitude, changed fealty to a feudal monarch into subordination to a collective strength vested in a divinely appointed emperor. She instituted an imperial tariff policy, compulsory military service, and a government system of industrial tutelage; and by means of these developed a superior fighting machine.

Such, in short, are the economic factors underlying the great ideals that antagonize one another on the battlefields of Europe: in England, individualism and democracy; in Germany, the spirit of subordination and the dynastic state. Around the German ideal of the state, fostered by imperial control of education and a sense of national efficiency and solidarity, there grew up a whole cultural scheme. The industrial revolution has not been able to exert its fullest cultural influence upon the German people, as it did in England, but eventually it will undermine the foundations of the dynastic state. So that "the movement for cultural reversion," for which the Germans strive today, "stands to gain

at least to the extent of a substantial, though presumably temporary, impairment and arrest of Western civilization at large."

This explanation is one that goes to the roots of the national spirit—one that gives a place to both material and ideal factors. Professor Dewey's recent book deals with the philosophic basis of the German spirit and, taken in conjunction with the work of Professor Veblen, puts rich significance into the present war. "Every living thought represents a gesture made towards the world, an attitude taken to some practical situation in which we are implicated." If the reader has developed a taste for the author's characteristically cumbrous verbiage, he will find *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* excellent in every respect.

R. E. FREEMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Socialists and the War. By WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1915. 8vo, pp. xii+512. \$1.50.

The attitude of the Socialist party with respect to the present war has caused considerable interest, and not a little disappointment. The fact that the Socialists of Europe are almost unanimously supporting their national governments during this clash of arms appears strangely inconsistent with the spirit of international solidarity which has long been emphasized as being the very essence of the socialistic movement. Mr. Walling has attempted to explain the socialistic position by assembling a mass of documentary material dealing with the party activities of the Socialists both immediately before and during the war. Little editorial comment has been added, although points considered of special importance have been marked by italics. A closing chapter deals with the various socialistic measures adopted by the warring nations since the outbreak of the war. The author points out, however, that these measures do not necessarily imply any permanent gain to Socialism, which is in itself something quite different from mere state control.

From the evidence given it would appear that before the war the Socialists of all countries were united in their desire for peace, the change in attitude taking place only after the actual outbreak of hostilities. Then it was that the spirit of nationalism prevailed. The international, essentially an instrument of peace, proved utterly ineffective as a tool of war. And each of the national Socialist parties, in abandoning the international principle, pleaded justification on the ground of the necessity of defending national independence and democratic rights. According to *Vorwaerts*, a German Social Democrat organ, "the German Social Democrats saw the terrible events that broke in upon us in an entirely different light from the French, the English, the Russians, the Servians. They and their Austrian friends saw an attack of the Russian